In 2011, at a meeting in Malta, Dutch scientist Ron Fouchier announced that he had created a particularly dangerous strain of the H5N1 flu virus using the tools of synthetic biology. Unlike all previously known versions of H5N1 – known colloquially as the “bird flu” – this variant could be spread through the air between people, potentially leading to a global pandemic. This may sound like the machinations of a supervillain bent on global destruction, but it was instead the pronouncement of a medical scientist who hoped to hasten pandemic preparation through preemptive study of the most virulent flu strains.
Fouchier’s bombshell alarmed many public health experts, who questioned the reasoning and overall benefit of intentionally bolstering the disease’s potency. The episode also highlighted the frighteningly real challenges of “dual-use research of concern” (DURC) in the synthetic biology field.
DURC refers to research that can have both positive and negative repercussions; for synthetic biologists, the ability to reprogram organisms allows for the creation and study of infectious agents that nature hasn’t yet produced. This way, scientists and health workers can begin to develop cures or devise protective strategies before it’s too late. But if such organisms fall into the wrong hands, things could get ugly.
In an article appearing in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Laurie Garrett places synthetic biology DURC in historical context and offers a few policy proscriptions to mitigate any unintended consequences of what she calls “biology’s brave new world.”
DURC is, perhaps, an inevitable stage of a scientific field’s relationship with society. “Each major discipline of science has had its moment,” Garrett explains, “when collectively the scientific community had to face the grim prospect that the things they were working on were as likely to be put to terrible use as to fantastic and beneficial use.” First it was chemistry – the Haber-Bosch process of the early 1900s made mass ammonia production possible, opening the door to higher food yields on the one hand, and chemical weapons on the other. Decades later, nuclear physics enabled both abundant power supply as well as the most destructive weapons ever created.
Now biology is facing its crossroads, as the ability to encode cells (which effectively act as adaptable, self-propagating mobile factories) brings with it great powers. The destructive potential of synthetically designed pathogens has yet to be displayed, but the platform is particularly concerning because of its potential for widespread distribution. The production of nuclear weapons, for example, requires enormous and sophisticated machinery, but a designer pathogen will soon be possible with a bioprinter and a digital file of “A”s, “T”s, “G”s, and “C”s. And if recent large-scale leaks are any indication, securing a computer file is a lot harder than keeping a rocket under lock and key.
Of course, there are no easy answers: lab work with threatening microbes may well help generate real solutions, but as Garrett argues, “just because you have a tool kit to ask almost any question imaginable doesn’t mean you should do so.”
So who should decide what types of organisms can be made, and where? It’s still an open question that invites discussion, but Garrett is emphatic about one thing: scientists should not be left to their own devices, free from regulation and oversight. “When scientists unilaterally make choices on a subject that is frightening to many and has deep controversial elements to it,” she notes, “they end up angering the general public, and it blows up in their face later.” Rather, she proposes a wider engagement, with a dose of realism. Law enforcement, intelligence, NGOs, humanitarian groups, scientists, public health workers – all should be involved in such wide-reaching policy issues.
And international collaboration is also a must, as the polarizing nature of American policy over-politicizes real issues. “In our current geopolitical scenario,” Garrett explains, “any time the U.S. is seen as the driving force on an issue, it automatically aligns the rest of the world according to who loves us and who hates us.” As a result, “the U.S. cannot unilaterally do anything meaningful.” Garret calls on emerging economies to take on a more substantive role, and champions improved detection and response strategies in the developing world. After all, threats from synthetic biology are rapidly scalable and undaunted by national borders.
And hopefully, as the world prepares for the uncharted and unpredictable worst, synthetic biology will realize its potential to yield equally surprising global benefits.
