Staff Sgt. Richard Rodriguez was on a mission. On March 27, the stocky military policeman from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division led a group of American and Afghan security forces on a foot patrol through the town of Baraki Barak, 50 miles south of Kabul. (See video above.)
Among Rodriguez's goals: to identify young, male candidates for a new militia-style, neighborhood-watch program – and enroll them in NATO's biometric database for vetting.
Spotting one likely candidate, Rodriguez extolled the virtues of joining the so-called "Afghan Local Police" as another soldier took the man's photo and fingerprints. If the recruit signed up, he would join an estimated 5,000 other men already committed to wear the blue ALP uniform and stand guard in their own villages, armed with AK-47s and their intimate knowledge of the local people and terrain.
NATO and Afghan commanders both agree that these fresh forces can't come soon enough. After no fewer than five attempts since 2001 to stand up inexpensive, minimally-trained local militia forces, the U.S.-led alliance is running out of time. The first of roughly 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan are slated to withdraw this summer, potentially leaving a huge gap in the country's defenses.
But when it comes to training and leadership for the new patrolmen, there seems to be some confusion. Some U.S. and Afghan officers say the local police will be trained and led by Afghan National Police. But NATO's top cop-trainer insists that's not the case – and only foreign Special Forces will have that responsibility.
The absence of clear plan could undermine the local-police program, at a stage of the war where there's simply no time to try raising yet another pro-NATO militia.
Afghan Leadership ...
It seemed so simple that day at Forward Operating Base Shank, a few miles from Baraki Barak in Logar province. It was March 21, the inaugural day of training for Logar's first ALP unit. Scores of overwhelmed-looking men in blue uniforms sat in folding chairs in a featureless room, waiting to have their fingerprints and personal details taken down. Others stood in formation on a patch of gravel outside, as an Afghan National Police officer drilled them in some basic marching techniques.
Inside, U.S. Army Maj. Josh McCully, an adviser to the provincial police chief, explained what the ALP program was all about and where he saw it heading over the next couple years. (See video above.)
"These are guys who've been vetted by their community to serve as local security forces for their villages," the intense, temperamental McCully said of the recruits sitting around him.
McCully explained the difference between the local cops and the similarly-dressed Afghan National Police, including the drill instructor barking marching commands outside. "The ANP recruits from all over the province and can go to different villages to work," he said.
"These guys," McCully added, indicating the new recruits, "are vetted from the community and will go back to their villages to provide security ... for their people."
Keeping patrolmen in their own villages has big advantages, McCully said. "It cuts down on corruption. It also builds community ties. They have a strong sense of community here in Afghanistan. It's important that they [the local police] are trusted by the village elders to come provide security for their village."
After registering that day, the ALP recruits would begin several weeks of basic military training provided by the Czech Republic, McCully explained. Afterward, the newly-minted local police force would be paired with NATO units that would mentor them in over a two-year period.
In addition, the local militia would receive training from the ANP, in a sort of expanded version of the drill instruction already occurring outside. "The Afghans are already starting to assist in training right now," McCully said. "The coalition has the lead – the Czech police are leading the program right now. They have a train-the-trainer program where Afghan police are starting to train their own police."
Would these Afghan National Police officers, initially trained by the Czechs and later by other Afghans, eventually handle instruction for the ALP? "Absolutely," McCully said.
... or Not
Maj. Agha, leader of the ANP force in Baraki Barak, agreed with McCully's description of the local militia's future. The district top cop (pictured above) said his men would mentor the town's local police force, once it had completed training at FOB Shank.
It was just a few minutes after Rodriguez and his men had completed their patrol in Baraki Barak on March 27. Rodriguez reclined on a cushion in Agha's chilly, concrete-walled personal quarters, part of a muddy compound adjacent to the town's main U.S. Army outpost. A boy scurried in with a tray bearing cups of hot, green tea. Rodriguez sipped his tea and described a time when Agha and his men saved the American sergeant's life.
They'd all been on patrol together when the Taliban attacked. Rodriguez tripped and fell. Prone on the ground, he was powerless to defend himself. That's when Agha's men rushed in, forming a human wall around Rodriguez, firing their weapons in all directions to ward off the attackers.
Agha said his patrolmen would take similar care of the local cops. "We'll help them [so that] whenever we give them a job, they do it correctly," Agha said through an interpreter. He added that he was eager to have militia reinforcements in Baraki Barak. Agha described the local police freeing up ANP troopers for raids and other missions beyond the town.
But McCully's and Agha's shared vision of ANP looking after their less-well-prepared ALP comrades is news to NATO's top police trainer. As Deputy Commander-Police with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Canadian army Maj. Gen. Stuart Beare oversees 200 foreign advisers helping instruct 125,000 national cops at 37 training centers across the country.
"That's the first time I've heard that," Beare admitted during a press conference last week, after hearing what McCully and Agha had said. "There is no intention at all for the ALP to become trained by the ANP," the general countered.
Instead, the local militiamen would be trained by NATO Special Forces, who are the only people with the expertise to handle a fast-growing body of new troops. "There is no intention at this time to transition training responsibility to anyone other than our own Special Forces because they [the ALP] are still growing at a great rate."
The ANP doesn't have time to take over local police training, Beare added. "We still need the ANP to be training more professional police."
It's possible that the ANP involvement in the ALP's formation, as McCully and Agha described it, could occur unofficially. And in any event, it seems inconceivable that national and local cops could patrol the same communities without some level of cooperation. In that case, it makes sense that more well-established ANP would assume the lead position over the new militiamen.
All the same, it's unclear why NATO and Afghan officers at different levels seem to have conflicting visions for the local police. And it's hardly confidence-inspiring for a force that's supposed to help secure an embattled country as foreign troop levels inexorably decline starting this year.
Photos and video: David Axe
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