Things Could Get Worse for Troubled Stealth Jet

Delays. Cost increases. Parts failures resulting in one model being placed on sudden-death probation. It’s been a rough couple years for the nearly $400-billion Joint Strike Fighter, the biggest program in U.S. military history. And according to aviation reporter extraordinaire Bill Sweetman, things could still get a lot worse: even higher costs, more delays and […]

Delays. Cost increases. Parts failures resulting in one model being placed on sudden-death probation. It's been a rough couple years for the nearly $400-billion Joint Strike Fighter, the biggest program in U.S. military history. And according to aviation reporter extraordinaire Bill Sweetman, things could still get a lot worse: even higher costs, more delays and increasing stress on a rapidly-aging fighter fleet.

In a series of posts (here, here and here) at the excellent Ares blog, Sweetman recaps all the recent twists and turns in F-35 development -- few of them positive for taxpayers, the Pentagon or JSF lead builder Lockheed Martin. "In short, the JSF program has gone six to nine months backwards in just over two years," Sweetman summarizes. In the same period, he adds, the cost of the jet's development -- never mind planned production of around 3,000 copies -- has increased by "$21 billion or 61 percent."

Originally, F-35s were scheduled to enter service starting in 2012. Now, the first squadrons will be combat-ready by 2016 at the earliest.

These changes amount to an inevitable correction for a jet that was under-bid, over-designed, forced onto cash-strapped allies through dirty diplomacy, rushed through early testing and launched into low-rate production too soon.

Until 2008, the F-35 seemed to be more or less on track, despite some low rumblings from a handful of Beltway skeptics. Granted, the JSF program was ambitious, aiming to replace thousands of Air Force F-16s, Navy F/A-18s and Marine Corps F-18s and Harriers with three broadly similar variants of a stealthy, low-cost design. And it would proceed quickly, entering service as early as 2012 for the Marine F-35B model. After 20 years building F-117 and F-22 stealth jets, Lockheed seemed to have the skills to pull it off.

Then there was the March 2008 report from the Government Accountability Office, which predicted a two-year delay and 60-percent cost increase for the JSF. The findings were repeated by a Pentagon auditing team one year later. Those reports, building on an series of government analyses stretching back to 2004, represented "the first signs of a seven-year history in which there have been two completely different narratives in the JSF program," Sweetman recounts.

On one side you have Lockheed, the F-35's military managers and their "paid and unpaid" allies in the media and various think-tanks "arguing that the program is sound and that setbacks are normal and temporary." On other side, "every independent agency [has been] saying something else" -- that the F-35 was in trouble.

The two camps have converged in the past year or so, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other top Pentagon brass have cracked open the JSF program to shed light on its ongoing problems. Gates fired the general in charge, pressured Lockheed and insisted on more honest accounting. “Some of the things that the Secretary has done of late are helpful," veteran Pentagon program manager Paul Kaminski said.

But it might be too late to save the program from the dreaded "death-spiral" of rising costs, delays and shrinking production quantities. "It’s hard to walk this dog back after all the requirements are in place and signed-up to,” Kaminski said.

In other words, the JSF's woes -- nearly a decade in the making -- could get worse, especially as impoverished European governments begin cutting back their orders. For the U.S. military, the consequences could be enormous. Yes, the Navy is still buying new F-18s and the Air Force has the F-22 and upgraded F-15s. But Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said last year that the F-35 is the only plane that can possibly replace the F-16s and older F-18s that form the backbones of America's air fleets.

If JSF costs rise, the government will just have to pay more, crowding out other priorities. If delays mount, the military will have to wait, increasing the risk that other countries might match America in the air. And if one model of the F-35 turns out to be unworkable, a military branch -- most likely, the Marines -- might have to give up jet fighters entirely.

*Photo: Lockheed
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