Last year, 10 French soldiers were killed in a brutal firefight in the Surobi district, east of Kabul. The incident outraged a great many people in France, particularly after photos were published in Paris Match showing insurgents with weapons, equipment and uniforms captured from the French soldiers.
Now the Times of London reports that the Italian secret service had been paying off Taliban commanders in region before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008. Both the Italian government and NATO have disputed that report -- a coalition spokesman in Kabul told the Associated Press, "we don't do bribes" -- but the story has provoked a major political controversy in Europe. Already, France's opposition Socialist Party is demanding answers, and Italy's defense minister has directed his staff to prepare a lawsuit against the British paper.
Regardless of the accuracy of the Times account, the story should also force re-examination of the "bribe the tribes" strategy being floated by a number of pundits as a solution to Afghanistan's troubles. After all, that approach seemed to work in Iraq's Anbar Province, where the United States paid Sunni insurgents not to fight.
The Times, in fact, implies that the attack only happened after French troops replaced the Italians, whose intelligence service had supposedly been paying Afghan insurgent commanders not to fight. Whether or not that is true, it points to the biggest flaw in the "bribe the Taliban" argument: What happens when you stop paying?
Once again, the Iraq example is instructive. Responsibility for paying Sunni tribal militias, referred to by the U.S. military as the Sons of Iraq (SoI), was handed over to the government of Iraq, and a certain number of SoI were eventually supposed to be absorbed into Iraq's security forces. But not all has gone to plan: Earlier this year, fighting erupted in Baghdad after the arrest of Adel Mashadani, a Sunni militia leader and key figure in the "Awakening" movement. As the central government moved to disarm and disband Awakening councils, it prompted concern about a renewed violence in Iraq as U.S. troops packed up for withdrawal.
And Afghanistan presents a much more difficult case. Iraq's central government can count on a decent stream of revenue; Afghanistan's government is pretty much broke. Bribery may work to a point, but it seems highly unlikely that Kabul could keep its internal opponents on the payroll when its operating budget is largely drawn from foreign aid and it can barely cover the cost of maintaining its army and police.
[PHOTO: ISAF]
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