Coast Guard Denies Cutter Allegations

In April, the Coast Guard’s national security cutter, Bertholf, passed a tough Navy inspection, despite earlier questions about the ship’s readiness. That raised the suspicions of outside observers — including our own David Axe. Sources close to the program told him that key communications gear was removed from the vessel, prior to the Bertholf’s inspection. […]

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In April, the Coast Guard's national security cutter,
Bertholf*, passed a tough Navy inspection, despite earlier questions about the ship's readiness. That raised the suspicions of outside observers -- including our own David Axe. Sources close to the program told him that key communications gear was removed from the vessel, prior to the *Bertholf's *inspection. Officials at the Coast Guard say they were never given a proper opportunity to respond to those allegations. So I asked the Coast Guard a series of questions about the *Bertholf's controversial test. Here's the response, from Rear Admiral Gary Blore, the Coast Guard's Chief Acquisition Officer:

Danger Room: Congressional investigators say that the U.S. Coast Guard "accepted delivery" of the Bertholf despite
"deficiencies in the classified C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] systems." These investigators add that "parts of these systems" were "removed prior to Navy final testing and USCG acceptance." Why were these systems removed? Who removed them? Were they later re-installed?

Coast Guard: No systems were removed. The U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) began preliminary review, including physical inspections of the Bertholf, in September 2007
– seven months prior to the beginning of formal acceptance trials in
April 2008. INSURV knew much of the classified portions of the C4ISR suite would not be complete before the acceptance trials. When false assertions of the removal of phantom C4ISR equipment were made, the Coast Guard presented
Congressional staff with sensitive information that directly countered the false assertions. Congressional oversight staffs have not questioned the Coast
Guard if equipment was removed since being provided that information. Due to the sensitive nature of the information provided to Committee staff, the Coast
Guard cannot publicly share those documents, which disclose equipment capabilities and could potentially compromise the security of the cutter and her crew. But the bottom line is no “parts of the (C4ISR) systems” were
“removed prior to Navy final testing and Coast Guard acceptance.”

Lastly, a look at the U.S. Navy’s Freedom Littoral Combat Ship disproves the assertion that conducting acceptance trials without a completely finished C4ISR suite is “unusual.”
Like Bertholf, its C4ISR suite will be finished following completion of INSURV
acceptance trials.

DR: What system was Bertholf using for secure communications instead, during her inspection?

CG: The Coast Guard did not operate classified systems on Bertholf prior to delivery, which included the during the INSURV inspection. Bertholf was not an operating unit of the
Coast Guard at the time of the INSURV inspection; it was still in production and the Coast Guard had not yet accepted delivery of the ship. After INSURV (and government preliminary acceptance on May 8, 2008), the Coast Guard’s C4ISR
Technical Authority, CG-6, granted Bertholf a limited authority to operate some of its installed unclassified systems to facilitate the vessel’s transit to its new homeport in Alameda, CA. This included an Authority to Operate (ATO) (granted on April 30, 2008) for a stand-alone, Tempest-certified, classified SDX messaging system; and, an Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) (granted on May 9, 2008) for limited network connectivity of the unclassified local area network and general support system. No classified systems, other than the properly certified stand-alone SDX system, were operated while the ship made its transit to her homeport.

DR: Were any other systems removed prior to the INSURV
inspection?

CG:* *No systems were removed.

DR: Tempest testing is used to make sure that communications gear doesn't leak out any signals that could be beneficial to an adversary. By your own documents say that such testing "began on April 14," three days after the conclusion of the INSURV process. We all know Tempest hardening is key to ensuring secure communications. How could the INSURV board credibly evaluate the Bertholf's C4ISR systems without Tempest testing?

CG: INSURV does not conduct C4ISR Tempest testing. The mission of INSURV is to conduct material inspections and surveys of ships and service craft and provide assessment of the material readiness of these vessels; to provide independent verification of a newly constructed ship’s readiness for acceptance/delivery; and to determine if builder responsible equipment is operating satisfactorily during the guarantee period following acceptance. As discussed in a Congressional
Research Service Report to Congress on June 5, 2008
, “In April 2008, the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspectors verbally commented that the internal C4ISR
cabling and wiring installation was of high quality. While there are some discrepancies, the C4ISR equipment functioned as designed for four separate underway trials. Bertholf's C4ISR basic equipment configuration has remained unchanged throughout all trials and during Tempest testing. New capability is scheduled to be added during post shakedown availability after final acceptance. Additional equipment and improvements will be incorporated as necessary (test-fix-retest methodology) to ensure systems are adequately shielded, bonded, and/or separated to eliminate any compromising emanations.
The Coast Guard, over the coming months, will work with the Navy’s Space and Naval
Warfare Command (SPAWAR)
to improve the Information Assurance posture of BERTHOLF until all systems are certified and accredited.”

To complete testing and gain Tempest certification and accreditation, the Coast Guard is working with the SPAWAR
and its own C4ISR technical authority (CG-6).

DR: According to Navy Times, "much of [Bertholf's]
information systems gear was not yet installed when InSurv came onboard
,"

and Navy inspectors were unable to "conduct full tests on the ship's radios." If that's the case, why was the ship's C4ISR gear allowed to pass the INSURV process at all?

CG: Classified components of the C4ISR gear were not “allowed to pass.” INSURV does not conduct C4ISR Tempest testing. The Coast Guard is working with the Navy’s
Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) and its own C4ISR technical authority
(CG-6) to complete testing and gain Tempest certification and accreditation.

DR: Rep. Elijah Cummings, chairman of the subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, said that he was "greatly concerned" that Bertholf was delivered "in spite of so many outstanding deficiencies —including several that have been starred by
U.S. Navy ship inspectors due to their potential to significantly impair the ship's operation." Your response?

CG: We appreciate Rep.
Cummings' appropriate oversight of the Coast Guard. Rep. Cummings has visited and toured Bertholf since that time, and spoke at its commissioning ceremony, saying "I know first-hand that the ship we commission today will be the most capable the Coast Guard has ever sailed – one that will carry the men and women who serve on it through the eyes of countless storms and return them safely back to their families ashore." The Coast Guard conditionally accepted Bertholf in May 2008, and all discrepancies were documented on the DD250(the formal equipment acceptance document used in the Navy and Coast Guard). Work continues on Bertholf and all discrepancies will be resolved prior to final acceptance, scheduled to occur around May 2009. Regarding the eight aforementioned
“starred” discrepancy cards – a very small number in comparison to similar first-in-class naval combatants – seven have been resolved. The conditions that precipitated INSURV's creation of a starred card for the MCMS (machinery control software) system have been sufficiently resolved to permit the closure of the card.
Closure of this final starred card pends underway testing occurring this week.

I am pleased to report that the
Coast Guard continues to make progress on achieving Tempest certification and ensuring Information Assurance requirements are met prior to final acceptance of the Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf. To read about our progress, please visit here.

We have consistently and repeatedly denied that equipment was removed from Bertholf to cheat on an
INSURV inspection. To date, no one has provided specific, verifiable evidence to the contrary; but if such evidence were received, it should be provided to the appropriate federal investigators. I appreciate the opportunity to provide the rest of the story to Danger Room readers.

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