Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Thomas Fingar gave in a recent speech what I can only describe as the best analogy ever for the Iraq WMD report:
Let me shift back into what got us here. It’s the Iraq WMD estimate. I think of this as having your year-book photo taken on the worst bad hair day ever. The community was never as bad as that estimate. The percentage of analysts who participated in the production of that hurry-up, get-it-out-the-door-in-two-weeks product was tiny compared to the larger set, all of whom were tarred with the same brush of incompetence. Half my work force has joined the government since that estimate was produced. Their capability and credibility is questioned for something that happened before they got here.
Restoring confidence in our work, in ourselves, in our colleagues had to be job one here. And restoring confidence by earning it, by demonstrating that we really are capable of good work and we’re capable of making it better – going back to basics. Out of the 9/11 and the WMD Commission criticisms, the number one was the production of analytic products and estimates. Number two was the President’s daily briefing process.
If you want straight talk, there you have it.
