Iraq's Superbombs, Still Home Made

There’s no deadlier weapon in Iraq than explosively-formed projectiles, or EFPs. The number of these so-called "superbomb" attacks has reportedly fallen off recently (see David Axe’s earlier, related post) but the story is still muddied by confusion about where they are coming from, in the first place. "Fewer Iran-made bombs in recent days," says the […]

Efp_iraq_2 There's no deadlier weapon in Iraq than explosively-formed projectiles, or EFPs. The number of these so-called "superbomb" attacks has reportedly fallen off recently (see David Axe's earlier, related post) but the story is still muddied by confusion about where they are coming from, in the first place.

"Fewer Iran-made bombs in recent days," says the MSNBC headline, supporting it with a comment for a US spokesman:

"The number of signature weapons that had come from Iran and had been used against coalition and Iraqi forces are down dramatically except for this short uptick in the EFPs in the early part of January," military spokesman Rear Adm. Gregory Smith told a news conference.

But others have cast serious doubt on whether the EFPs are 'signature' weapons of Iran. This reportby security analyst Gareth Porter explains why.

U.S. command had considerable evidence that the Mahdi army had gotten the technology and the training on how to use it from Hezbollah rather than Iran.

The command, operating under close White House supervision, chose to deny these facts in making the dramatic accusation that became the main rationale for the present aggressive U.S. stance toward Iran. Although the George W. Bush administration initially limited the accusation to the Quds Force, it has recently begun to assert that top officials of the Iranian regime are responsible for arms that are killing U.S. troops.

British and U.S. officials observed from the beginning that the EFPs being used in Iraq closely resembled the ones used by Hezbollah against Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon, both in their design and the techniques for using them.

Hezbollah was known as the world’s most knowledgeable specialists in EFP manufacture and use, having perfected them during the 1990s in the military struggle against Israeli forces in Lebanon. It was widely recognised that it was Hezbollah that had passed on the expertise to Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups after the second Intifada began in 2000.

U.S. intelligence also knew that Hezbollah was conducting the training of Mahdi army militants on EFPs. In August 2005, Newsday published a report from correspondent
Mohammed Bazzi that Shiite fighters had begun in early 2005 to copy
Hezbollah techniques for building the bombs, as well as for carrying out roadside ambushes, citing both Iraqi and Lebanese officials.

Severals hauls of EFP 'liners' -- the crucial copper lens that forms an armor-piercing slug when the bomb is detonated -- have been found in
Iraq, as well as facilities for making them. At first it was claimed that these were quite distinct from those suppoedly imported from Iran, but this has since broken down.

The explosive expert who claimed at the February briefing that EFPs could only be made in Iran was then made available to the New York Times to explain away the new find. Maj. Marty Weber now backed down from his earlier statement and admitted that there were “copy cat” EFPs being machined in Iraq that looked identical to those allegedly made in Iran to the untrained eye.

Weber insisted that such Iraqi-made EFPs had slight imperfections which made them “much less likely to pierce armour”. But NBC’s Arraf had reported the previous week that a senor military official had confirmed to her that the EFPs made in Iraqi shops were indeed quite able to penetrate U.S. armour. The impact of those weapons “isn’t as clean”, the official said, but they are “almost as effective” as the best-made EFPs.

The idea that only Iranian EFPs penetrate armour would be a surpise to Israeli intelligence, which has reported that EFPs manufactured by Hamas guerrillas in their own machine shops during 2006
had penetrated eight inches of Israeli steel armour in four separate incidents in September and November, according to the Intelligence and
Terrorism Center in Tel Aviv.

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