Ed Gillespie, executive director of the new pro-encryption coalition Americans for Computer Privacy, comes to the job with plenty of inside-the-Beltway experience pitching complicated issues to the public.
His current message is one dear to the hearts of privacy advocates across the political spectrum: Encryption is, far from being a geek issue, essential to citizens' individual liberty. The mission that goes with the message is a tough one: to halt a Clinton administration drive to set up a system requiring that software equipped with data-scrambling capabilities also include a way for law enforcement or national security agencies to quickly access the encrypted information.
Gillespie's resumé includes a stint as communications director for the Republican National Committee, pitching and promoting House Republicans' Contract with America in 1994, and dishing out PR advice to GOP heavyweights Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey.
A master at pushing a partisan agenda, Gillespie will take the high road with the encryption campaign, attempting to steer clear of partisan politics. In an interview Tuesday with Wired News, Gillespie described how he will sell unrestricted strong encryption to the public.
Wired News: What's your position on encryption policy?
Ed Gillespie: Americans for Computer Privacy is opposed to new domestic controls that would limit the freedom that Americans currently enjoy for strong encryption and we're in favor of easing government restriction on US strong encryption products abroad - where there are currently already over 200 strong-encryption products on the market from foreign manufacturers. We favor full House passage of the SAFE [Security and Freedom through Encryption] Act as passed by the House judiciary committee. We are against the FBI proposal to require Americans to turn over their privacy codes to government-approved third parties.
WN: Given that, what is your group's ultimate objective?
EG: To pass legislation that codifies the current freedom Americans enjoy for strong encryption and lifts the current restraints against US manufacturers selling strong encryption abroad. There are 260 co-sponsors in the House for the SAFE Act. So we have a good base of strong bipartisan support in the House of Representatives for the SAFE Act and for this policy.
WN: How do you handle the opposition?
EG: There is a lot of opposition in the House. It's very focused opposition and we have to overcome that very focused opposition to the bill and (shore) up the broad support for it - and get the broad support to be as equally focused and intense as the opposition.
The way to do that is to make it clear to members of Congress that encryption is not just a computer issue - it's a privacy issue, it's a health-care records issue, it's a taxpayer protection issue, it's a competitiveness and jobs issue - so that they understand the importance to constituents across the board - and not just the [encryption] industry.
WN: How can you succeed where other efforts have failed?
EG: We'll make it easier for the leadership to bring it to the floor for a vote, which they have said they intend to do. Majority leader Dick Armey - for whom I used to work - released a list of legislative priorities for this Congress and encryption was on there.
WN: How do you make it easier?
EG: We have put together a very strong team to help us get the message out to America and then back to members of Congress.
We're working now on a grass-roots plan so that members hear about it directly from their constituents when they're home. The centerpiece of this strategy is to make it clear to members of Congress that this is an issue that is important to all Americans - and that it's not just a computer issue.
WN: How much money do you have and how will you spend it?
EG: Easily in the six- to eight-figure range - upwards of $10 million. We're still putting together the plan for the allocation of resources into media back in members' districts, into grass-roots contact, into media in Washington, the national media, into direct one-on-one lobbying, into educational efforts for members of Congress. It will be a full-fledged media and Web campaign.
WN: What's your lobbying strategy?
EG: The policy arguments here are as strong as I have ever seen. When you say to politicians, as I have been doing, would you favor mandating that private citizens give their PIN number for private records and data to some government-approved third party which might easily be misused, abused, or controlled? Their most immediate response is to say no.
Well, that's what the FBI proposal is, and the more they come to understand it the more they realize it's terrible - both members on the left and the right.
And then when you say "Why in the world would you want our companies to cede the lead in this critical technology to companies in Japan and Russia and China?" they soon realize that the national security argument is weak. And then you point out the fact that strong encryption is a crime deterrent - you know, the arguments are very strong. It's just a matter of getting them delivered in the right way.
WN: But how will you sell the public on abstract notions of encryption and key recovery?
EG: Well, one of the things we've found actually is that encryption is much more broadly understood than may be perceived. Voters have a pretty good sense of what encryption is - they deal with it at work and on home computers.
It's key recovery - that's the challenge. Our challenge is to make it clear that it is important to their everyday lives. To make it clear that encryption is a PIN code - like the code for getting cash with your ATM card. And what we've talked about is the notion of saying, "Imagine if you were required to give your ATM card to some government-approved third party or a government agent, so that if they wanted to check your available balance from time to time without your knowledge they would easily be able to do that."
That's one very quick analogy that people immediately get the gist of. Then, when you start talking about it in terms of health-care records and so forth - the challenge is to make it clear that we're not just talking about your personal computer, we're talking about millions - literally millions every day - of these PIN codes or keys to encryption being stored by government-approved third parties. What becomes vulnerable are all these systems and databases where information about you might be stored: your health-care records, your insurance, your banking transactions, your credit-card history. [Suddenly] all of the folks who hold all this information about you and keep it encrypted will be required to provide some third party with the key to that encryption.
That's where the light bulb goes off. And they say - and we've seen this in various focus groups and talking to people - "How do we trust these people? How do we stop them from using the keys to obtain information about you for marketing purposes?" Or the government - they're afraid about notions that the government may obtain personal information.
So the third-party key recovery concept - the more people know about it, the less they like about it. And it's our challenge to let them know that this is important and this is why it's important.
WN: So it's not such a hard sell?
EG: I'll tell you, it doesn't take much to get 'em there. Because every day they open the newspaper and they see some story of privacy being encroached in the information age. The biggest one most recently was the Navy guy on AOL - but there have been others since.
It's out there in the ether - and the public is more cognizant of it. It doesn't take much of a push for them to understand the implications.
Once you make that leap and say that all of a sudden, now more people would have access to all this personal data, and that you'd become more vulnerable - they are immediately against third-party key recovery. Even though they don't know it's third-party key recovery.
WN: And this message can be shoehorned into a 30-second TV spot?
EG: It will be. We've got this honed for a print ad already. We can do it for television, too. And we'll keep it up as long as it takes.
WN: Will you take any different approach on the Web side?
EG: You can start at a less fundamental level in making your case. But I think my task is to make sure that the Internet campaign, the lobbying campaign, the paid media - print, radio and television - the "earned" media [press coverage], and the grass-roots contact - that it's all a consistent message.
Because that's where you really get the echo chain going. Members [of Congress] get it coming and going - on the radio in their home district; they get it on their television in Washington; they get it when they're in session; they get it from their constituents; they get it from CEOs that come in from the district meetings. When you have this kind of coalition in place, you can really make sure an issue resonates.
Wired News interview conducted by staff reporter Chris Oakes.
